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RECENT CASES
junction, in the instant case, should not have been denied, either upon the
showing of public benefit or upon a comparison of the injuries. As a result
of Boomer, in an effort to further weigh the hardships in their favor, future
litigants may have to commence an action before the defendant suffers a
large investment in the construction of the facility which threatens to be a
nuisance or employs persons from the community. 36 An action to enjoin
an anticipatory nuisance, in those cases where a subsequent action to enjoin
the actual nuisance would propose a "drastic remedy," 37 would prevent the
defendant's injuries and inconveniences and, therefore, preclude the result-
ing inequities of an injunction. The court will have to take cognizance of
the inequities raised by the overruling of Whalen and provide more affirma-
tive protection for the small property owner than Boomer seems to allow.
BRUCE V. WEITZEN
RETALIATORY EVICTIQN-STATUTE PRESCRIBING CRIMINAL PEN-
ALTIES FOR LANDLORD REPRISALS AGAINST TENANTS WHO REPORT VIOLATIONS
or HOUSING OR HEALTH LAWS HELD CONSTITUTIONAL
A tenant in a seven-family house registered several complaints with the
board of health relating to the condition of her premises. Subsequently,
the owner increased the complaining tenant's rent from $117.50 to $175.00
per month. Pursuant to the provisions of the New Jersey retaliatory eviction
statute, the State brought criminal charges against the landlord. The statute
stipulates that any person who takes or threatens to take a reprisal against
a tenant who makes reports of violations of the health or housing code, is
to be adjudged disorderly, and may be subject to the maximum penalty
of six months imprisonment and a $250.00 fine.2 The tenant testified that
36. See Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MIcH. L. REv. 1377 (1965).
37. See 26 N.Y.2d at 225, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
I. Although the statute mentions "health or building codes," not specifically housing
codes, the term is included as a "law or regulation which has as its objective the regula-
tion of rental premises." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
2. The New Jersey retaliatory eviction statute in full provides:
Any person, firm or corporation or agent, officer or employee thereof who threatens to
or takes reprisals against any tenant for reporting or complaining of the existence or
belief of the existence of any health or building code violation, or a violation of any
other municipal ordinance or State law or regulation which has as its objective the
regulation of rental premises, to a public agency, is a disorderly person and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $250.00, or by imprisonment for not more than
6 months or both.
In any action brought under this section the receipt of a notice to quit the rented
premises or any substantial alteration of the terms of tenancy without cause within
90 days after making a report or complaint or within 90 days after any proceeding
resulting from such report or complaint shall create a rebuttable presumption that
such notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant for making such report or
complaint.
N.J. STA:. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
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the defendant had acknowledged to her that his action was an attempt to
force her to move because she had made reports of violations to the board
of health. Defendant contended that his conduct was not in retaliation for
the tenant's complaints, but instead was predicated upon his feeling that
she was an undesirable tenant. The defendant was convicted in the Newark
Municipal Court, and on appeal, was granted a trial de novo in the Essex
County Court. The County Court also adjudged the defendant a disorderly
person and fined him $50.00. He appealed to the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court on the constitutional grounds that application of the statute
deprived him of both property and the right of freedom of contract -without
due process of law, and that the statute was void for overbreadth and
vagueness. The defendant further contended that the rebuttable presump-
tion created by the statute was invalid because the inference drawn from
the facts was strained and not rationally connected in common experience."
The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed his conviction. Held, the
statute, prescribing penalties for a landlord taking or threatening to take
reprisals against a tenant who reports the existence of any health or housing
code violation, is a constitutionally reasonable exercise of police power.
State v. Field, 107 N.J. Super. 107, 257 A.2d 127 (App. Div. 1969).
Landlords renting in the low-income market rarely give a written lease
to their tenants; instead, they prefer to rent from month to month and
at will.4 Common law allows a landlord to terminate either of these tenancies
for any purpose upon reasonable notice to the tenant.5 As a result, low-
income tenants who seek enforcement of health and housing code regula-
tions by reporting alleged violations to a government agency find that the
landlord may respond by giving a notice to terminate or by raising the
rent to a prohibitive level.7 Eviction is an acute problem to low-income
3. Brief for Defendant at 27, State v. Field, 107 N.J. Super. 107, 257 A,2d 127 (App.
Div. 1969).
4. See Salsick, Housing and the States, 2 THE URBAN LAwYEi 40, 46 (1970); Mc-
Elhaney, Retaliatory Evictions: Landlords, Tenants and Law Reform, 29 MD. L. Rv.
193, 195 (1969); Wright, The Courts Have Failed The Poor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1969, §
6 (Magazine), at 108, col. 2.
5. See De Wolfe v. McAllister, 229 Mass. 410, 118 N.E. 885 (1918); Radigan v. Hughes,
86 Conn. 536, 86 A. 220 (1913); Fowel v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 205 (D.C. Mun.
Ct. App. 1947).
6. See 1 CCH PovERTY L. REP. f 2210 (1969); Comment, Tenqnt's Remedies in Dis.
trict of Columbia: New Hope for Reform, 18 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 80, 93-94 (1968).
"With the poor service of process which is prevalent in urban areas, often the first
notice that a tenant receives of the eviction is when the sheriff arrives to dispossess." Note,
Eviction Procedure in Public Housing, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 310, 317 (1968).
7. See Note, Landlord and Tenant-Eviction, 82 HI-tv. L. REv. 932, 935 (1969); Mos-
kovitz, Retaliatory Evictions-The Law and the Facts, 3 CLEAPINGHousE Rrv. 4, 5 (1969),
Note, Retaliatory Evictions-Is California Lagging Behind?, 18 HAsTINcs L.J. 700, 705
(1967).
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families because of the difficulty of finding alternate housing in their low-
vacancy market8 and because of the great expense of moving.9 Consequently,
fear of retaliation by their landlord often deters tenants from reporting
health and housing violations and thereby hampers the attempts of regulat-
ing agencies to improve the quality of housing.1° While most states have
codified the common law regarding termination of tenancy from month to
month and tenancy at will, the major modification has usually been that
a thirty day notice to terminate may be given to either party."' Only
recently have some courts and legislatures begun to recognize the retaliatory
motive of landlords as a defense to an eviction.12
In 1964, the retaliation defense was first given judicial recognition in
New York when it was held in Tarver v. G. & C. Construction Corp.,'8
that legal enforcement of a retaliatory eviction violates a citizen's constitu-
tional right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 14 The
In addition to reporting housing or health code violations, a number of other activi-
ties by tenants which have resulted in retaliatory evictions have been: tenant organizing
activity, such as forming tenant unions (see 1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. f[ 2210.80 (1969) ;
Davis & Schwartz, Tenants Unions: An Experiment in Private Law-Making, 2 HARV. CIV.
RIGinTs-Csv. Lm. L. REv. 237 (1967)); rent withholding and threats to withhold rent until
building code violations are remedied (see McElhaney, supra note 4, at 194; Note. Rent
Withholding and the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 304, 310
(1965)); tenant complaints to the landlord (see Salsich, supra note 4, at 47) ; participating
in a rent strike (see Gibbons, Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: A Survey of Modern
Problems with Reference to the Proposed Model Code, 21 HASrINcs L.J. 369, 391-92 (1970)).
"The eviction procedure 'may also be utilized to render moot an appeal on a novel defense
by the tenant in an action for possession or rent, or perhaps on a cause of action of first
impression." Note, Habitability in Slum Leases, 20 S.C.L. REV. 282, 295 (1968).
8. For information on the shortages of low-income housing, see Freidick & Seidel,
Rdcent Trends in Housing Law: Prologue to the 70"s, 2 THE URBAN LAWYER 1 (1970);
Loeb, The Low-Income Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGs L.J.
287 (1970); Keith, An Assessment of National Housing Needs, 32 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
209 (1967).
9. "[T]he availability of other housing may be further reduced because the tenant
may be marked as a troublemaker and landlords may therefore exclude him." Comment,
Protection for Citizen Complaints to Public Authorities-Prohibition of Retaliatory Evic-
tions, 48 NEB. L. REv. 1101, 1106 (1969).
10. See 2 LAW IN ACTION 1, 6 (1968); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 701 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
11. See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEo.
L.J. 519, 541-42 (1966). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 21A:18-53, 21A:18-56 (1952); N.Y. Rr.AL
PROP. LAw §§ 228, 232-a, 232-b (McKinney 1968).
12. See 1 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 1 2210 (1969). Retaliatory eviction "is new only
because in the past such evictions were not challenged." Id.
13. Civil No. 64-2945 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 9, 1964).
14. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Tarver made a complaint to the County Health Department
and the same day received a notice from the landlord that their rent would be increased
from $35 to $150 per week. After finding "that the Tarvers have made a clear showing
that they will probably be able to prove upon the trial that they are threatened with evic-
tion solely because they exercised their Constitutional right to petition for a redress of
their grievances," a preliminary injunction was granted to enjoin the defendants from
evicting or in any way "retaliating against" the Tarvers.
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court reasoned that the first and fourteenth amendments protected this
right from government infringement.15 Actual government infringement
was shown by reliance upon the "state action" principle; a state court, in
effecting such an eviction, would be aiding one citizen to infringe upon
the rights of another.16 In what has become a landmark case for tenants'
rights, the United States Court of Appeals in 1968, in Edwards v. Habib,11
declared that a landlord cannot evict in retaliation for his tenant's report
of housing code violations to the authorities.' 8 The majority reasoned that
Congress had evinced a strong policy of enforcement of the housing code
for the District of Columbia which was largely dependent upon a tenant's
ability to report infractions of the code.19 Allowing retaliatory evictions, the
court concluded, would defeat this policy. Judicial recognition of the de-
15. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
makes the first amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances
applicable to the states. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
The Bill of Rights of many states also contain provisions asserting this right to peti-
tion. See e.g., N.J. CONsr. art. I, 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.
16. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), declared "rtlhat the action of state courts
and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment .. " Id. at 14.
In Shelly, judicial enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant that applied to pri-
vate dwellings was held to be "state action" and thereby in contravention of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
See Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 250, 22 Cal. Rptr.
309, 317 (1962), where it was held that judicial enforcement of an eviction solely because
of race is "state action."
For further explanation of the "state action" doctrine, see Horowitz, The Misleading
Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REv, 208 (1957);
Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment and the State Action Doctrine, 24 WAsH. & LEE IL,
REv. 133 (1967).
17. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
18. Id. at 699. For additional information on the significance of the Habib case, see
Comment, supra note 9; Note, Landlord and Tenant-Eviction, 82 HARv. L. REV. 932 (1969);
Note, Landlord and Tenant-Retaliatory Evictions, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 410 (1969).
19. 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 N.S. 1016 (1969).
The housing and sanitary codes, especially in light of Congress' explicit direction
for their enactment, indicate a strong and pervasive congressional concern to secure
for the city's slum dwellers decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live. Effec-
tive implementation and enforcement of the codes obviously depends in part on pri-
vate initiative in the reporting of violations .... To permit retaliatory evictions, then,
would clearly frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code as a means of upgrading
the quality of housing in Washington.
397 F.2d at 700-01.
The court cited John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 89 U.S. App. D.C.
26, 191 F.2d 483 (1951), in explaining its position that "a presumption against the legality
of such intimidation can be inferred as inherent in the legislation even if it is not ex-
pressed in the statute itself." 397 F.2d 687, 701-02 & n.48 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
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fense in other jurisdictions has come slowly.2 0 In 1969, in spite of Tarver,
the question was still not settled in New York State.21 In January of 1970,
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin concluded that the public policy of the
state, as espoused in its housing statutes, permits the tenant to utilize a
defense of improper retaliatory motive in an eviction proceeding.&2 2 As in
20. A reason why judicial recognition of the defense of retaliatory eviction has been
slow is that many judges believe that such a change in landlord-tenant law should be
made by legislative action and not by judicial decision. See Weinberg v. Scheper, No.
24453-68 (Baltimore People's Ct., Nov. 30, 1968); La Chance v. Hoyt, No. CV 14-685-35
851 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 14th Cir., Sept. 6, 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 889, 173
N.V.2d 297 (1970) (dissenting opinion); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969).
Also, other than in New York City and Washington, D.C., few retaliatory eviction
cases seem to have come to the courts.
21. See Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501, 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Club
Van Cortlandt v. Hosey, 2 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 11,644 (N.Y. App. Div., June 11, 1970).
the court ruled that a tenant could properly raise the defense of retaliatory eviction in a
summary holdover proceeding.
At least one author believes that retaliatory eviction is a recognized defense in New
York State courts. Gibbons, supra note 7, at 395 9- n.147. Compare Hubbard v. Alex-
andria Hotel Co., Civil No. 69-2945 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 29, 1969), where the U.S. District
Court said that a tenant facing summary eviction because of her tenant-organizing
activities was not entitled to an injunction in a federal court action, even though
she may have established a deprivation of her right to free speech, because she had
an adequate remedy at law in state courts, with Lawrence v. Benaminer Realty
Corp., Civil No. 69-3405 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 22, 1969), where a tenant, who alleged that com-
plaints to city authorities about housing code violations resulted in her being denied a
larger apartment in the same building where she resided, was entitled to a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the landlord from renting the larger apartment to anyone other
than the tenant:
In New York state and municipal courts, see McDonnell v. Sir Prize Contracting Corp.,
32 App. Div. 2d 660, 300 N.Y.S.2d 696 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.) where the court held that
N.Y.C. RENT, EVICTION AND REHABILITATION REcs. § 51(b) prohibits an attempt to remove
a tenant because he has taken action authorized by the Rent Law or the Regulations; In re
Seril, 2 CCH POVERTY L. REP. 11,237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Mar. 10, 1970) where a landlord
was denied an eviction certificate because he failed to establish an immediate and com-
pelling necessity and good faith, as required by N.Y.C. RENT, EVICTION AND REHABILITATION
REGS. § 55(a). But cf. Lincoln Square Apts. v. Davis, 58 Misc. 2d 292, 295 N.Y.S.2d 358
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1968) in which the court ruled that it had no jurisdiction to determine
the constitutional issue raised in the affirmative defense. See also Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc.
2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Binghamton City Ct. 1968), where it was held that the defense
of retaliation for reporting housing violations is included under N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTIONS
LAW § 743 (McKinney Supp. 1968), which permits any legal or equitable defense in a sum-
mary proceeding; 703 Realty Corp. v. Greenbaum, Civil No. 83930/69 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.,
Dec. 19, 1969) which held that New York public policy prohibits the eviction of a tenant
in retaliation for making complaints about the building to governmental agencies; a
stipulation that sought to restrict the tenant from resorting to the authorities to protect
himself was held unenforceable.
22. Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.V.2d 297 (1970). The court relied upon
statutory interpretation, stating: "It is our opinion that public policy as espoused in
Ch. 66, Stats. clearly indicates that the legislature intended that housing code violations
should be reported. If a landlord could terminate a tenancy solely because his tenant had
reported a violation the intention of the legislature would be frustrated." Id. at 392, 173
N.W.2d at 301.
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Habib, the Wisconsin court reasoned that a landlord is permitted to ter-
minate a tenancy at will or a periodic tenancy for any legitimate reason or
for no reason at all, but he cannot terminate the tenancy in retaliation for
a tenant's report of code violations. 23 The elements required for a successful
defense of retaliation in Wisconsin were specifically set out; there must be
clear and convincing evidence that: (1) an actual violation of the housing
code existed; (2) the landlord must have had knowledge that the tenant
made a complaint to a government agency; and (8) the retaliation must-
have been the landlord's sole reason for seeking to terminate the tenancy.24
In 1968, the Illinois legislature enacted the first statute recognizing
the retaliation defense without making provisions for specific action
or penalties. 25 It simply declared that evictions or refusal to renew a
tenancy in response to complaints regarding housing and health code
violations was against the state's public policy. Since then, five additional
states have enacted retaliatory eviction statutes; four of these statutes
provide civil remedies.2 6 The statutes of Connecticut,27 Massachusetts,28
23. Id. at 392, 173 N.W.2d at 301-02. See also Terrace v. Sylvester, 2 CCH PoVrRTy
L. RFp. 10,371 (D.C. Ct. of Gen. Sess., July 30, 1969), where an eviction of a tenant in
retaliation for making complaints of violations of the housing code was upheld, because
the landlord had proved that there was another, more dominant, reason for the tenant's
eviction.
24. 45 Wis. 2d at 393, 173 N.W.2d at 302.
25. The Illinois retaliatory eviction statute provides:
It is declared to be against the public policy of the State for a landlord to terminate
or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy of property used as a residence on the ground
that the tenant has complained to any governmental authority of a bona fide violation
of any applicable building code, health ordinance, or similar regulation. Any provision
in any lease, or any agreement or understanding, purporting to permit the landlord
to terminate or refuse to renew a lease or tenancy for such reason Is void.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (1963).
26. Connecticut (Pub. Act No. 315, 3 Conn. Leg. Serv. 339 (1969)); Massachusetts
(MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 18, ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1970)); Michigan (MIcH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.5646 (Supp. 1969)); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (Spec. Supp.
1968)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969)).
At least three other states provide a limited defense to retaliatory eviction In con-
nections with state rent withholding laws. Maryland (ch. 233, [1969] Md. Laws 680);
Missouri (Pub. Act No. 315, § 13, 3 Mo. Leg. Serv. 483 (1969)); Pennsylvania (PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-01 (Supp. 1969)).
27. In any action for summary process under chapter 922 of the general statutes It
shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because
the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including contacting officials of
the state or of any town, city, borough or public agency, any condition constituting a
violation of any of the provisions of chapter 352 of the general statutes or of the
housing or health ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the
subject of the complaint lie. The obligation on the part of the defendant to pay rent
or the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises which are the
subject of any such action shall not be abrogated or diminished by any provision of
this act.
Pub. Act No. 315, 3 Conn. Leg. Serv. 339 (1969).
28. It shall be a defense to an action for summary process that such action was in
reprisal for the act of the tenant for reporting a violation or suspected violation of
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Michigan, 29 and Rhode Island30 provide that tenants may use proof of a
retaliatory motive by the landlord as a defense to an action for eviction.31
A second Massachusetts statute also makes provision for monetary damages
law, as provided in section eighteen of chapter one hundred and eighty-six. The
commencement of such action against a tenant within six months after the making
of such report by said tenant shall create rebuttable presumption that such action is
a reprisal against the tenant for making such report.
MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1970).
29. (3) When proceedings are commenced under this chapter to regain possession
following the alleged termination of a tenancy for nonpayment of rent, the defendant,
in an appropriate pleading, may state such defense as he may have upon the lease or
contract, or against the opposing party.
(4) When proceedings commenced under this chapter are to regain possession of
the premises following the alleged termination of a tenancy, if the defendant alleges
in a responsive pleading and if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that
any of the following situations exist, judgment shall be entered for the defendant:
(a) That the alleged termination was intended as a penalty for the defend-
ant's attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease or contract, or under the
laws of the state or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United States.
(b) That the alleged termination was intended as a penalty for the
defendant's complaint to a governmental authority with a report of plaintiff's
violation of any health or safety code or ordinance.
(c) That the alleged termination was intended as retribution for any other
lawful act arising out of the tenancy.
(d) That the alleged termination was of a tenancy in housing operated by
a city, village, township or other unit of local government, and was terminated
without cause.
(5) When proceedings commenced under this chapter are to regain possession
of the premises following the alleged termination of a tenancy, if the defendant
alleges and it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff attempted
to increase the defendant's obligations under the lease or contract as a penalty for
such lawful acts as are described in subsection (4), and that the defendant's failure
to perform such additional obligations was a material reason for the alleged ter-
mination, judgment shall be entered for the defendant on the claim of possession,
and all such additional obligations shall be void.
Mici. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5646 (Supp. 1969).
30. When proceedings commenced under this chapter are to regain possession of the
premises following the alleged termination of a tenancy, if the defendant alleges in
his answer and if it appears by a preponderance of the evidence that any of the
following situations exist, judgment shall be entered for the defendant:
(A) That the alleged termination was intended as a penalty for the
defendant's justified attempt to secure or enforce rights under a lease or contract,
or under the laws of the state or its governmental subdivisions, or of the United
States.
(B) That the alleged termination was intended as a penalty for the
defendant's justified complaint to a governmental authority with a report of
plaintiff's violation of any health or safety code or ordinance.
(C) That the alleged termination was intended as a penalty for any other
justified lawful act of the defendant.
(D) That the alleged termination was a tenancy in housing operated by a
city, town, municipal housing authority, or other unit of a local government,
and was terminated without cause.
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (Spec. Supp. 1968).
31. Connecticut provides protection only: (1) when the landlord brings an action for
eviction solely because the tenant tried to remedy a violation by "lawful means;" (2) for
tenant complaints of housing or health code violations; and (3) when the tenant com-
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against any person who takes or threatens reprisals against a tenant.3 2 Only
New Jersey has chosen a criminal statute to deter retaliatory evictions.33
The statute extends to tenant complaints regarding both health and build-
ing code violations and violations of state and municipal laws or regula-
tions which have as their objective the regulation of rental premises. 3 4
While the statute contains an evidentiary provision creating a rebuttable
presumption of retaliation when there is a reprisal within 90 days of either
the tenant's complaint or any proceeding resulting from that complaint, it
does not make provision for the tenant to use the landlord's improper
motive in a civil case, as a defense in summary proceedings or to enjoin
the eviction.35 The latter questions have been before the New Jersey
courts.36 One such case held that a tenant has the right to a full jury trial
on the issue of retaliation, and if the landlord's improper motive is
plaints produce actual violations of the housing and health ordinances. Pub. Act No. 315,
3 Conn. Leg. Serv. 339 (1969).
Both the Michigan and Rhode Island statutes grant a defense to tenants in an eviction
proceeding, not only when termination is attempted for securing rights under the rental
agreement or for reporting code violations to the authorities, but when "the alleged
termination was intended as retribution for any other lawful act arising out of the
tenancy," (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5646 (Supp. 1969)) and when "the alleged termination
was intended as a penalty for any other justified lawful act of the defendant." (R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (Spec. Supp. 1968)). Note the broad language of the Rhode Island
statute.
The Massachusetts law goes beyond the other civil statutes in establishing a rebuttable
presumption of retaliation if an action for eviction is brought within six months of the
report by the tenant. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 18, ch. 239, § 2A (Supp. 1970).
32. The Massachusetts statute provides:
Any person or agent thereof who threatens to or takes reprisals against any
tenant of residential premises for reporting to the board of health or, in the city
of Boston, to the commissioner of housing inspection or to any other board having
as its objective the regulation of residential premises a violation or a suspected
violation of any health or building code or of any other municipal by-law or ordi-
nance, or state law or regulation which has as its objective the regulation of residential
premises shall be liable for damages which shall not be less than one month's rent
or more than three month's rent, or the actual damages sustained by the tenant,
whichever is greater, and the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The receipt of any notice of termination of tenancy except for nonpayment of
rent or of increase in rent or of any substantial alteration in the terms of tenancy
within six months after making a report or complaint of violations or suspected
violations of any health or building code, municipal by-law or ordinance, or state law
or regulation which has as its objective the regulation of residential premises shall
create a rebuttable presumption that such notice is a reprisal against the tenant for
making such report or complaint.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 186, § 18 (Supp. 1970).
33. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-92.1 (Supp. 1969).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. E.g., Alexander Hamilton Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J. Super. 89,
257 A.2d 7 (Hudson County Dist. Ct. 1969).
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proved, a permanent injunction can be issued.37 However, the court did
not allow the tenant to use the rebuttable presumption of the criminal
retaliatory eviction statute; the burden of proof to show improper motive
remained on the tenant.38
In the instant case, the court unanimously held that it was constitu-
tional for the State of New Jersey to impose criminal penalties upon a
landlord who takes reprisals against a tenant because he has reported viola-
tions of health code standards in his rented premises. Implicit throughout
the decision is the court's belief that this was a situation where the public
good of insuring proper housing conditions for the citizens of New Jersey
demanded that the state place restrictions on the rental of realty. The court
reasoned that government, in the exercise of its police power, may adopt
reasonable health and housing regulations.3 9 The enforcement of these
regulations to eliminate health violations is largely dependent upon tenant
complaints and, therefore, it is a legislative concern that tenants not be
intimidated.40 If these tenant reports are stopped, the effectiveness of hous-
ing and health legislation will be substantially impaired.41 Responding
succinctly to each of the defendants' claims, the court declared that there
was no substance in the due process and overbreadth arguments because
the "statute is on its face addressed to a lawful end;" it was not even neces-
sary to invoke the "presumption in favor of the statute's constitutionality."'4
Similarly, the court stated that there was no merit in the argument that
the words "reprisals" and "without cause" rendered the statute void for
vagueness. 43 Also, the rebuttable presumption was held to be valid because
it satisfied the constitutional standard that there be a rational connection
in common experience between the fact to be proved and the ultimate fact
to be presumed.44
Even though the constitutionality of the New Jersey statute has been
upheld in the instant case, the position of the tenant is still insecure for
two reasons. First, the possibility of a criminal sanction may not be a suf-
37. Kernodle v. Antonette Apartments Corp., Civil No. C-402-79 (Super. Ct., Mar.
25, 1970), afJ'd, Civil No. A-1270-69 (App. Div., June 8, 1970). The Appellate Division of
the Superior Court did not reach the issue of whether the rebuttable presumption of the
criminal statute can be used in a civil case.
38. Id. Improper retaliatory motive is extremely difficult to prove when the burden
of proof is on the tenant. Schier, Protecting the Interests of the Indigent Tenant: Two
Approaches, 54 CALF. L. REv. 670, 682 (1966); Note, Retaliatory Evictions-Is California
Lagging Behind?, 18 HASrINGs L.J. 700, 705 & n.34 (1967).




43. Id. at 111-12, 257 A.2d at 129.
44. Id. at 112,257 A.2d at 129.
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ficient deterrent to stop retaliatory evictions. 45 Generally, the enforcement
of housing regulations by the institution of criminal sanctions has not been
successful. In addition to a record of listless enforcement,46 the courts have
been unwilling to recognize housing violations as true crimes. 47 For exam-
ple, in New York City, where fines up to $1,000 per housing code violation
may be imposed for repeated offenders, 48 the average fine per violation in
1965 was about fifty cents. 49 Also, investigations have shown that jail sen-
tences for housing code convictions are rarely imposed.60 Therefore, if a
record of minimal enforcement coupled with small penalties upon infre-
quent convictions prevails in New Jersey,51 the retaliatory eviction statute
will do little to curtail reprisals.52 Second, the statute is strictly penal in
nature and does not afford protection to a tenant in a civil action for
eviction.53 The tenant must be given the civil defense of being allowed to
prove his landlord's improper retaliatory motive. In addition, it is essential
for proper protection of tenants that the rebuttable presumption established
in the criminal statute be incorporated into this common law civil defense.
45. See Gibbons, Landlord-Tenant Problems, in LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR-
A GumE FOR NEw JEPsEY LEGAL SERVICES PROJECT ATTORNEYS 275 (E. Jarmel ed. 1968).
Landlords have found retaliatory evictions to be useful in stopping complaints by
other tenants and ridding themselves of the leader of a tenant union or some other
"trouble-maker." Id. at 295-96. See Moskovitz, supra note 7, at 4.
Also, continuances for landlords in New Jersey have been as long as eighteen months.
Goldberg, Landlord-Tenant Law Entirely Fair?-A Reply, 93 N.J.L.J. 109, 114 (1970).
46. See Goldberg supra note 45, at 114.
47. See Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66
COLUM. L. Rxv. 1254, 1279 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78
HARv. L. REv. 801, 820 (1965).
48. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 304 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE,
§ D-26-8.0 (1956).
49. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 47, at 1276. See also Marco & Mancino, Housing
Code Enforcement-A New Approach, 18 CLv.-MAR. L. REv. 368, 870-72 (1969).
Some landlords have even attempted to write off housing code fines as business
expenses on their income tax returns. Note, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the
Conservation of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. CHu. L. REv. 180, 189 n.44 (1963).
The amount collected from fines may be substantially less than the costs in prosecut-
ing the violations. Legislative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, LEGAL
REMEDIES IN HOUSING CODE ENFORCEmENT IN NEw YORK Crry 42-43 (1965).
50. Gribetz & Grad, supra note 47, at 1277; Wright, supra note 4, at col. I.
51. In the opinion of Joseph Wilkins, attorney, Cape-Atlantic Legal Services, New
Jersey, it accomplishes little to fine a landlord under the criminal retaliatory eviction
statute when the repairs are most frequently more costly than the fine.
What if there were continued prosecution of a landlord until the housing violations
were repaired? "The practical realities of small town politics operate as a bar to vigorous
prosecution of landlords in these matters," says Mr. Wilkins. Interview by telephone,
Sept. 9, 1970.
52. There may be some small consolation for a tenant who is being evicted in New
Jersey that judges have discretion to stay the issuance of a warrant for eviction up to six
months. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (1952).
53. See Goldberg, supra note 45, at 114. See supra text at notes 85-38.
RECENT CASES
It is submitted that if the state legislature does not actA the New Jersey
cIourts should construe the disorderly person's statute as a broad expression
of public policy prohibiting retaliatory eviction, and thereby uphold the
tenants' civil defense of improper retaliatory motive in eviction proceed-
ings. In states which have no law prohibiting retaliatory evictions, states
might enact a civil statute55 which would: (1) allow the tenant to plead
and prove a reprisal 56 for any justified lawful act57 (or alternatively, for
reporting violations or suspected violations58 of any law dealing with the
regulationi of rented premises) of the tenant,59 as a defense to an eviction
action; 60 (2) create a rebuttable presumption of retaliation ;ivhen a reprisali
is made within a specific period 62 after either the actions of the tenant, or
any legal proceeding that may result from those actions; and (3) provide
for the payment of damages if retaliation is proved. A statute is preferable
to judicial recognition because it presents exact standards for enforcement,
54. The General Assembly of New Jersey did introduce (Mar. 19, 1970) and later
passed an amended version of the state's criminal retaliatory eviction statute. One of the
striking features of the bill was its provision that, "the landlord shall be subject to a
civil action by the tenant, for damages and other appropriate relief including injunctive
and other equitable remedies . . ." for violation of the provisions of this proposed law
(N.J. General Assembly, No. 831). The state Senate also passed the bill and sent it on
to the Governor for his signature on June 8, 1970. Governor Cahill did not sign the bill
and has returned it to the Assembly.
55. Families who want "decent, or at least safe and sanitary, places to live," as
Judge Wright called it in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687,. 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert..
denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1969),- have little interest and little to gain in criminal actions that
may fine or imprison a landlord. See J. LEvI, P. HABLu'ZEL, L. ROSEBERO, & J. Wnrn,
MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (Tent. Draft, American Bar Founda-
tion 1969), for an example of a retaliatory eviction statute integrated into landlord-tenant
law. See also Note, Retaliatory Evictions: A Study of Existing Law and Proposed Model
Code, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 537 (1969).
f 56. "Reprisal" is an inclusive term which should cover all acts of retaliation includ-
ing terminating the tenancy, increasing the rent, and substantially altering the terms of
the tenancy.
" 57. "Justified lawful act" is more inclusive than some statutes which deal only with
tenants who make complaints to housing or health agencies. Such lawful activities as
forming tenant unions, making complaints to the landlord, apprising tenants of their
rights under the rental laws, etc. should be protected. See, eg., R.I. GEN. LAws ANN.
§ 34-20-10(C) (Spec. Supp., 1968).
58. A policy decision must be made as to whether suspected violations (i.e., com-
plaints which do not turn out to be in violation of the rental laws) will be included
in the statutory protection. Including suspected violations may allow a tenant to make
frivolous complaints in order to delay an eviction. On the other hand, if a tenant may
face eviction when an honest belief of a violation turns out to be wrong, the tenant may
be deterred when he must elect to make a complaint at his peril.
59. The statute may choose to include protection for all tenants or just those in
residential premises.
60. In the case of a retaliatory rent increase or alteration of the 'terms of the
tenancy, the tenant can refuse to pay the rent, and upon receiving-a 'n6tice to terminate,
submit the increase or alteration as proof of retaliation.
61. See supra note 56.
62. The Illinois statute uses six months; New Jersey has chosen a hinety day period.
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however, if the legislatures are unwilling to act, then the retaliation defense
,might be allowed by the courtsa on any number of grounds.0 4 Whether it
be by judicial or legislative action, each state must secure legal protection
for every tenant who exercises his right to secure safe and sanitary living
accommodations.
LARRY SCHAPIRO
SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW-PuRELY ETHICAL OR MORAL BELIEFS
HELD GROUNDS FOR CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR EXEMPTION
On April 24, 1964, petitioner, Elliott Ashton Welsh, II, applied for a
conscientious objector exemption from military service by filing an applica-
don with his local draft board. Petitioner claimed that the basis for his
conscientious objector beliefs had been formed "by reading in the fields of
history and sociology."1 Upon completion of the application he affixed his
signature to the statement, "I am, by reason of my religious training and
belief, conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form," after
he had stricken the words, "religious training and."2 On the same applica-
tion, petitioner denied that he believed in a Supreme Being, but later
amended this, stating that he preferred to leave the issue open. The peti-
63. "[rjhe need for judicial action is strongest in the areas of the law where political
processes prove inadequate, not from lack of legislative power but because the problem
is neglected by politicians." Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HAv. L. REv. 91,
122 (1966).
1. 64. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969), raises three theories:
I. the landlord's improper motive deprives the tenant of his first amendment right
to petition the government for a redress of grievances;
2. a citizen's right to inform the government of violations of law is constitutionally
protected;
3. retaliatory evictions are contrary to public policy as enunciated by the legislature.
A fourth theory would allow retaliatory motive to be raised under state statutes which
permit equitable defenses. Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 1110, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281
(Binghamton City Ct. 1968).
A fifth theory could be to argue that the use of the judicial process to order evictions,
where a landlord's principal reason to evict the tenant is for having reported the viola-
tions, constitutes an unconstitutional chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights of the tenants.
Finally, it can be argued: "A normally unrestricted right to sever or refuse to renew
a contractual relationship may be restricted where the reason for such severance or refusal
is contrary to public policy, usually as expressed by some statute. Such cases tend to occur
in labor law .. " Moskovitz, supra note 7, at 6.
1. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 341 (1970) [hereinafter cited as instant case].
2. To qualify for conscientious objector exemption, the applicant must file Selective
Service form SSS 150 with his local draft board. This form, which contains the statement
in the text, must be signed by the applicant before he may be considered for conscien-
tious objector exemption.
